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Abstract
We consider the problem of fairly reallocating the individual endowments
of a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences. We
provide a new concept of fairness, called position-wise envy-freeness, that is
compatible with individual rationality. This new concept requires that each
demander (i.e., agent whose most preferred amount is strictly greater than
his endowment) should not envy another demander who does not receive his
endowment and that each supplier (i.e., agent whose most preferred amount is
strictly less than his endowment) should not envy another supplier who does
not receive his endowment. We establish that a rule is ecient, individually
rational, strategy-proof, and position-wise envy-free if and only if it is the
\gradual uniform rule," which is an extension of the well-known uniform rule.
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of fairly reallocating the individual endowments of a per-
fectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences.1 This situa-
tion may occur particularly when the existing allocation is unsatisfactory owing to
changes in preferences over time.2
Envy-freeness is the most standard concept of fairness in the literature. It states
that every agent prefers his assignment to everybody else's. However, this concept
is quite demanding in our setting, because the set of individually rational (no agent
prefers his endowment to his own assignment) and envy-free allocations might be
empty. This motivates us to search for fairness concepts that are compatible with
individual rationality.
We propose a new notion of fairness called position-wise envy-freeness. In our
setting, we categorize \traders" (i.e., agents whose most preferred amounts are not
equal to their endowments) into two positions: an agent is a \demander" (\supplier")
if his endowment is strictly less (greater) than his most preferred amount. The notion
of position-wise envy-freeness then states that each demander (supplier) prefers his
own assignment to another demander's (supplier's) assignment that is not equal to
his endowment. That is, we weaken envy-freeness by only requiring each agent not to
envy another agent who is in the same position and does not receive his endowment.
The existence of individually rational and position-wise envy-free allocations, of
course, is guaranteed.
We next construct a position-wise envy-free and individually rational rule. We
call it the \gradual uniform rule." This rule is an extension of the uniform rule (Be-
nassy, 1982), which is the best-known rule in this problem. Furthermore, we estab-
lish that the gradual uniform rule is the only one satisfying eciency (no Pareto
improvement is possible) and strategy-proofness (no one can gain by preference mis-
representation) in addition to individual rationality and position-wise envy-freeness.
There is another way to extend the notion of envy-freeness to the case of economies
with individual endowments, which is to dene envy-freeness in terms of changes
in allocations rather than in terms of nal allocations. This concept is called envy-
freeness on net trade, which requires that no agent prefers another agent's net trade
1This \reallocation problem," rst analyzed by Klaus et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b), is a natural
extension of the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of a perfectly divisible good
among agents having single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991). For comprehensive surveys
of the literature on private good economies in which agents have single-peaked preferences, see
Klaus (1998) and Thomson (2014).
2See Klaus et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b) and Klaus (1998) for interpretations of this problem.
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to his own.3 It is also compatible with individual rationality. Klaus et al. (1997,
1998a, 1998b) apply it to our setting and construct an envy-free on net trade rule
called \uniform reallocation rule." The uniform reallocation rule, which is another
extension of the uniform rule, is the only one satisfying eciency, strategy-proofness,
and envy-freeness on net trade (Klaus et al., 1998b). However, the uniform real-
location rule is not position-wise envy-free. This suggests that whenever we insist
on fairness criteria for nal allocations rather than for changes in allocations, the
gradual uniform rule is more favorable than the uniform reallocation rule.
In Section 2, we set up the model and introduce basic properties of allocations
and rules. In Section 3, we spell out a new concept of fairness. In Section 4, we
introduce the three main rules and show the main result.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be the set of agents. There is one perfectly divisible good.
Each agent i 2 N owns an individual endowment ei 2 R+ of the good. Let e 
(e1; : : : ; en) 2 Rn+ be the prole of individual endowments, and let E 
P
i2N ei.
Each agent i 2 N has a single-peaked preference relation Ri on [0; E]: there is a
point p(Ri) 2 [0; E] such that for each pair fxi; yig  [0; E], if either yi < xi  p(Ri)
or p(Ri)  xi < yi, then xi Pi yi, where Pi is the asymmetric part of Ri. The point
p(Ri) is called the peak of Ri. Let p(R)  (p(R1); : : : ; p(Rn)) be the prole of
peaks. We denote the set of all single-peaked preferences dened on [0; E] by R.
An element R  (R1; : : : ; Rn) of Rn is called a preference prole. Given R 2 Rn
and i 2 N , let R i  (Rj)j 6=i. The set of feasible allocations is
X 
(
(x1; : : : ; xn) 2 Rn+ :
X
i2N
xi = E
)
:
A rule is a function f : Rn ! X assigning to each preference prole R 2 Rn
a feasible allocation f(R)  (f1(R); : : : ; fn(R)) 2 X, where fi(R) means agent i's
assignment at R.
The following properties of allocations and rules are standard in the literature.
 Eciency: An allocation x 2 X is ecient for R 2 Rn if there is no x0 2 X
such that for each i 2 N , x0i Ri xi, and for some j 2 N , x0j Pj xj. A rule f is
3The notion of envy-freeness in terms of changes in allocations is rst formulated by Schmeidler
and Vind (1972) in the context of pure exchange economies.
3
ecient if for each R 2 Rn, f(R) is ecient for R.
 Individual rationality: An allocation x 2 X is individually rational for
R 2 Rn if for each i 2 N , xi Ri ei. A rule f is individually rational if for each
R 2 Rn, f(R) is individually rational for R.
 Strategy-proofness: For each R 2 Rn, each i 2 N , and each R0i 2 R,
fi(R) Ri fi(R
0
i; R i).
Eciency requires that there be no other feasible allocation such that someone
can be made better o without anyone else being made worse o. Individual rational-
ity requires that no agent prefers his individual endowment to his own assignment.
Strategy-proofness requires that no agent can ever benet from misrepresenting his
preferences.
3 Position-Wise Envy-Freeness
The following property of fairness is central to the mechanism design literature.
 Envy-freeness: An allocation x 2 X is envy-free for R 2 Rn if for each pair
fi; jg  N , xi Ri xj. A rule f is envy-free if for each R 2 Rn, f(R) is envy-free
for R.
Envy-freeness, which is rst introduced by Foley (1967), requires that no agent
prefers another agent's assignment to his own. Unfortunately, in our setting, the
set of individually rational and envy-free allocations might be empty. This observa-
tion motivates us to seek meaningful notions of fairness that are compatible with
individual rationality.
We now introduce a new concept of fairness that is compatible with individual
rationality. In doing so, we call an agent a trader if his endowment is not equal to
his peak. We now categorize traders into two \positions": an agent is a demander
(supplier) if his endowment is strictly less (greater) than his peak. Given R 2 Rn,
let Nd(R)  fi 2 N : p(Ri) > eig and N s(R)  fi 2 N : p(Ri) < eig be the sets of
demanders and suppliers at R, respectively.
 Position-wise envy-freeness: An allocation x 2 X is position-wise envy-
free for R 2 Rn if for each pair fi; jg  N , if xj 6= ej and either fi; jg  Nd(R)
or fi; jg  N s(R), then xi Ri xj. A rule f is position-wise envy-free if for each
R 2 Rn, f(R) is position-wise envy-free for R.
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Position-wise envy-freeness states that each demander (supplier) prefers his own
assignment to another demander's (supplier's) assignment that is not equal to his
individual endowment. Hence, we weaken the notion of envy-freeness by allowing
agents to envy (i) agents not in the same position and (ii) agents receiving their
endowments.
It should be noted that an individually rational and position-wise envy-free al-
location always exists. A typical example of such an allocation is the prole of
individual endowments.
Remark 1. Klaus et al. (1998b) consider the following notion of fairness that is
compatible with individual rationality :
 Envy-freeness on net trade: For each R 2 Rn and each pair fi; jg  N ,
fi(R) Ri maxfei + (fj(R)  ej); 0g.
It requires that no agent prefers another agent's net trade to his own. Although both
this notion and our notion incorporate individual endowments into envy-freeness,
they are based on signicantly dierent concepts: the former is related to fairness
criteria for nal allocations, and the latter, to fairness criteria for changes in alloca-
tions.4 
4 Results
The following rule is the best-known one in the social endowment setting.5
Uniform rule, U : For each R 2 Rn and each i 2 N ,
Ui(R) =
8<:minfp(Ri); g if
P
j2N p(Rj)  E;
maxfp(Ri); g if
P
j2N p(Rj)  E;
where  2 R+ solves
P
j2N Uj(R) = E.
4As mentioned in Introduction, envy-freeness on net trade is based on the idea of Schmeidler
and Vind (1972).
5The uniform rule is introduced by Benassy (1982). Sprumont (1991) rst provides an axiomatic
characterization of the uniform rule in the social endowment setting. Subsequently, there have been
many studies on characterizing the uniform rule in the social endowment setting. See, for example,
Ching (1994), Thomson (1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1997), Chun (2006), Serizawa (2006), Mizobuchi and
Serizawa (2006), Sakai and Wakayama (2012), and Wakayama (2015). See also Thomson (2014)
for a survey of the characterizations of the uniform rule. Sonmez (1994) and Barbera et al. (1997)
describe an algorithm that computes the allocation of the uniform rule.
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The uniform rule is ecient, strategy-proof, and envy-free. Moreover, it is the
only rule satisfying these three properties (Sprumont, 1991). However, this rule
violates individual rationality.6 In this sense, the uniform rule is not suitable for use
in our setting.
The following rule extends the uniform rule to account for individual endow-
ments.
Uniform reallocation rule, U r: For each R 2 Rn and each i 2 N ,
U ri (R) =
8<:minfp(Ri); ei + g if
P
j2N p(Rj)  E;
maxfp(Ri); ei   g if
P
j2N p(Rj)  E;
where  2 R+ solves
P
j2N U
r
j (R) = E.
The uniform reallocation rule is the most studied in our setting.7 It is well known
that the uniform reallocation rule is the only one satisfying eciency, strategy-
proofness, and envy-freeness on net trade (Klaus et al., 1998b). Furthermore, it is
individually rational. However, as we show below, this rule violates position-wise
envy-freeness.
Proposition 1. The uniform reallocation rule is not position-wise envy-free.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume n = 3. Let e = (1; 5; 10) and R 2 R3
be such that p(R) = (6; 15; 8). Then, U r(R) = (2; 6; 8). Hence, f1; 2g  Nd(R) and
U r2 (R) > e2, but U
r
2 (R) = 6 P1 2 = U
r
1 (R). This means that the uniform reallocation
rule is not position-wise envy-free.
We extend the uniform rule to satisfy both individual rationality and position-
wise envy-freeness.8
Gradual uniform rule, G: For each R 2 Rn and each i 2 N ,
Gi(R) =
(
minfp(Ri);maxfei; gg if
P
j2N p(Rj)  E;
maxfp(Ri);minfei; gg if
P
j2N p(Rj)  E;
where  2 R+ solves
P
j2N Gj(R) = E.
6As mentioned above, envy-freeness is incompatible with individual rationality.
7See Klaus et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b), Klaus (1998, 2001), Moreno (2002), and Bonifacio (2015).
8A similar functional form appears in the social endowment setting under constraints. See
Berganti~nos et al. (2015).
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The gradual uniform rule G is an extension of the uniform rule U in the sense
that if for each pair fi; jg  N , ei = ej, then U(R) = G(R).
The following example demonstrates the computation of the gradual uniform
allocation for the case where the sum of agents' peaks is strictly greater than the
sum of individual endowments.
Example 1. Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and e = (1; 7; 3; 10). Let R 2 R4 be such that
p(R) = (7; 13; 4; 4). Therefore, the sum of the peaks is strictly greater than the sum
of the individual endowments. Then, the gradual uniform allocation of this problem
can be determined as follows. Agent 4 receives his peak. We now have to divide the
amount agent 4 supplies (i.e., the six units of the good) among the demanders. We
increase the amounts of the demanders until we have assigned the amount agent 4
supplies as follows. We rst increase the amount of the demander with the smallest
individual endowment (i.e., agent 1) until it reaches either his peak or the second
smallest individual endowment among the demanders (i.e., agent 3's individual en-
dowment). We then obtain \temporary" allocation (3; 7; 3; 4). There remain the
four units of the good. We next increase the amounts of agents 1 and 3 equally un-
til one of them reaches either his peak or the third smallest individual endowment
among demanders (i.e., agent 2's individual endowment). We then obtain \tempo-
rary" allocation (4; 7; 4; 4). Now, agent 3 receives his peak. We still have to allocate
the two unit of the good. Again, we increase the amount of agent 1 until it reaches
either his peak or the third smallest individual endowment among demanders. We
then obtain allocation (6; 7; 4; 4) and complete this process. Note that this example
yields  = 6. We note further that allocation (6; 7; 4; 4) is individually rational and
position-wise envy-free. 
From Example 1, we observe that there exist dierences between the gradual
uniform rule and the uniform reallocation rule. According to the latter rule, we
obtain allocation (3:5; 9:5; 4; 4). However, this allocation is not position-wise envy-
free, because both agent 1 and agent 3 are demanders, and agent 1 envies agent 3
who does not receive his endowment. In contrast, the gradual uniform rule selects a
position-wise envy-free allocation. In fact, for every preference prole, the gradual
uniform rule selects a position-wise envy-free allocation.
Proposition 2. The gradual uniform rule is position-wise envy-free.
Proof. Let R 2 Rn. In order to prove position-wise envy-freeness of G, we have
to show that for each pair fi; jg  N , if Gj(R) 6= ej and either fi; jg  Nd(R) or
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fi; jg  N s(R), then
Gi(R) Ri Gj(R): (1)
Let i 2 N . Consider the case Pj2N p(Rj)  E (the other case is similar and we
omit the details). We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: i =2Nd(R). Then, Gi(R) = p(Ri). This implies (1).
Case 2: i 2 Nd(R). Let j 2 Nd(R) be such that Gj(R) 6= ej. Then, ej < .
Otherwise, Gj(R)  minfp(Rj);maxfej; gg = minfp(Rj); ejg. Since p(Rj) > ej,
we have Gj(R) = ej, a contradiction. Therefore,
Gj(R)  minfp(Rj);maxfej; gg = minfp(Rj); g: (2)
By the denition of G, there are two subcases.
Subcase 2.1: p(Ri)  maxfei; g. Then, Gi(R) = p(Ri). Hence, (1) is
trivially true.
Subcase 2.2: p(Ri) >maxfei; g. By (2),
Gj(R) = minfp(Rj); g    maxfei; g < p(Ri):
Since Gi(R) = maxfei; g, this implies (1).
The gradual uniform rule satises not only individual rationality and position-
wise envy-freeness but also eciency and strategy-proofness. Furthermore, we show
that it is the only rule satisfying these properties.
Theorem 1. The gradual uniform rule is the only rule that satises eciency,
individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and position-wise envy-freeness.
Proof. It is easy to see that the gradual uniform rule G is ecient, individually
rational, and strategy-proof. By Proposition 2, G is position-wise envy-free.
To prove the remaining part of the theorem, let f be a rule satisfying the four
properties. Let R 2 Rn. We show that for each i 2 N , fi(R) = Gi(R). Consider
the case
P
j2N p(Rj)  E (the other case is similar and we omit the details).
Claim 1. For each i 62 Nd(R), fi(R) = p(Ri) = Gi(R).
Proof of Claim 1. Let i 62 Nd(R). Then, p(Ri)  ei. By the denition of G, p(Ri) =
Gi(R) is obvious. We prove only fi(R) = p(Ri). Suppose, by contradiction, that
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fi(R) 6= p(Ri). It then follows from eciency that fi(R) < p(Ri). Since p(Ri)  ei,
we can take R0i 2 R such that p(R0i) = p(Ri) and ei P 0i fi(R). By individual
rationality and eciency, fi(R) < fi(R
0
i; R i)  p(Ri). Then, fi(R0i; R i) Pi fi(R),
which contradicts strategy-proofness. Hence, fi(R) = p(Ri).
If for each i 2 Nd(R), fi(R)  Gi(R), then Claim 1 and feasibility together
imply that for each i 2 Nd(R), fi(R) = Gi(R). This, together with Claim 1, yields
that for each i 2 N , fi(R) = Gi(R). Therefore, in what follows, suppose that there
is j 2 Nd(R) with fj(R) < Gj(R). Without loss of generality, we assume
f1(R) = minffj(R) : fj(R) < Gj(R)g: (3)
Claim 1 ensures that 1 2 Nd(R), that is,
p(R1) > e1: (4)
Claim 2. f1(R) < .
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose, by contradiction, that f1(R)  . By (3), f1(R) <
G1(R)  minfp(R1);maxfe1; gg. It then follows that f1(R) < maxfe1; g: If
maxfe1; g = , then  > f1(R)  , a contradiction. If maxfe1; g = e1, then (4)
implies that f1(R) < e1 < p(R1), which contradicts individual rationality. Hence,
f1(R) < .
Claim 3. For each i 2 Nd(R), if f1(R) > fi(R), then fi(R) = p(Ri).
Proof of Claim 3. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is i 2 Nd(R) such that
f1(R) > fi(R) and fi(R) 6= p(Ri). Then, (3) implies that fi(R)  Gi(R). Thus, by
Claim 2,
 > f1(R) > fi(R)  Gi(R)  minfp(Ri);maxfei; gg: (5)
If minfp(Ri);maxfei; gg = p(Ri), then fi(R)  p(Ri). Since fi(R) 6= p(Ri),
fi(R) > p(Ri), which contradicts eciency. If minfp(Ri);maxfei; gg = maxfei; g,
then fi(R)  maxfei; g  . This, together with (5), implies that  > , a contra-
diction.
Claim 4. There is h 2 Nd(R) such that fh(R) > eh and fh(R) > f1(R).
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Proof of Claim 4. Note that by (3), f1(R) < G1(R). Thus, by feasibility, there is
h 2 N such that fh(R) > Gh(R)  minfp(Rh);maxfeh; gg. By Claim 1, h 2
Nd(R). We also assert that minfp(Rh);maxfeh; gg = maxfeh; g, that is, fh(R) >
maxfeh; g; otherwise, fh(R) > p(Rh), which contradicts eciency. Hence, fh(R) >
eh. It also follows from Claim 2 that fh(R) > maxfeh; g   > f1(R).
Notice that since G is ecient, (3) implies that E  p(R1)  G1(R) > f1(R).
Therefore, we can take R^1 2 R such that
p(R^1) = p(R1) and E P^1 f1(R): (6)
Claim 5. For each i 2 N , fi(R^1; R 1)  fi(R).
Proof of Claim 5. Let i 2 N . We divide the argument into three cases.
Case 1: i = 1. By eciency, f1(R)  p(R1) = p(R^1) and f1(R^1; R 1) 
p(R1) = p(R^1). If f1(R) < f1(R^1; R 1), then f1(R^1; R 1) P1 f1(R), which contra-
dicts strategy-proofness. If f1(R^1; R 1) < f1(R), then f1(R) P^1 f1(R^1; R 1), which
contradicts strategy-proofness. Hence, f1(R^1; R 1) = f1(R).
Case 2: i 62 Nd(R). By the same way as Claim 1, we have fi(R^1; R 1) = p(Ri).
Hence, fi(R^1; R 1) = fi(R).
Case 3: i 2Nd(R). Then,
p(Ri) > ei: (7)
Now, there are three subcases.
Subcase 3.1: f1(R) > fi(R). By Claim 3, fi(R) = p(Ri). Then, by eciency,
fi(R^1; R 1)  p(Ri) = fi(R):
Subcase 3.2: f1(R) = fi(R). Suppose, by contradiction, that fi(R^1; R 1) >
fi(R). Then, fi(R^1; R 1) 6= ei; otherwise, by (7), p(Ri) > ei = fi(R^1; R 1) > fi(R),
which contradicts individual rationality. By Case 1, fi(R^1; R 1) > fi(R) = f1(R) =
f1(R^1; R 1): By eciency, p(R^1) = p(R1) > f1(R) = f1(R^1; R 1). Then, either
(i) p(R^1)  fi(R^1; R 1) > f1(R^1; R 1) or
(ii) E  fi(R^1; R 1) > p(R^1) > f1(R^1; R 1).
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In either case, by (6),
fi(R^1; R 1) P^1 f1(R^1; R 1): (8)
Since fi(R^1; R 1) 6= ei and f1; ig  Nd(R^1; R 1), (8) implies a contradiction to
position-wise envy-freeness. Hence, fi(R^1; R 1)  fi(R).
Subcase 3.3: f1(R) < fi(R). By position-wise envy-freeness, either
(i) fi(R^1; R 1) = ei or
(ii) fi(R^1; R 1)  f1(R^1; R 1).
If (i) holds, then fi(R^1; R 1) = ei  fi(R); otherwise, by (7), p(Ri) > ei =
fi(R^1; R 1) > fi(R), which contradicts individual rationality. If (ii) holds, then,
by Case 1, fi(R^1; R 1)  f1(R^1; R 1) = f1(R) < fi(R). Hence, fi(R^1; R 1) 
fi(R).
Claim 6. There is h 2 Nd(R) such that fh(R^1; R 1) < fh(R).
Proof of Claim 6. By Claim 4, there is h 2 Nd(R) such that fh(R) > eh and
fh(R) > f1(R). Then, we show that fh(R^1; R 1) < fh(R). Otherwise, since f1(R) =
f1(R^1; R 1) (Case 1 of Claim 5), fh(R^1; R 1)  fh(R) > f1(R) = f1(R^1; R 1). It
then follows from (6) that
fh(R^1; R 1) P^1 f1(R^1; R 1): (9)
Since fh(R^1; R 1)  fh(R) > eh and f1; hg  Nd(R^1; R 1), (9) implies a contradic-
tion to position-wise envy-freeness.
By Claim 5, for each i 2 N , fi(R^1; R 1)  fi(R). By Claim 6, for at least one
agent h 2 N , fh(R^1; R 1) < fh(R). These imply
E =
X
j2N
fj(R^1; R 1) <
X
j2N
fj(R) = E;
which is a contradiction. Therefore, for each i 2 N , fi(R)  Gi(R). It thus follows
from feasibility that for each i 2 N , fi(R) = Gi(R).
Remark 2. Our theorem does not use the full force of strategy-proofness. In fact,
Theorem 1 holds even if strategy-proofness is relaxed with \strategy-proofness for
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same tops" (Sakai and Wakayama, 2012).9 From this, we can easily obtain another
characterization of the gradual uniform rule by replacing strategy-proofness with
\peak-only."10 
Before concluding this section, we establish the tightness of Theorem 1. The
uniform reallocation rule is an example of a rule satisfying all properties but not
position-wise envy-freeness. The uniform rule is an example of a rule satisfying all
properties but not individual rationality. The endowment rule (that always assigns
to any agent his endowment) is an example of a rule satisfying all properties but
not eciency. The following example illustrates a rule satisfying all properties but
not strategy-proofness.
Example 2. Let n = 3 and e = (1; 2; 1). Let R^ 2 R3 be such that 1 I^1 3 and
p(R^) = (2; 3; 0), where I^1 denote the indierence part of R^1. Dene f
 as follows:
for each R 2 R3,
f (R) =
8<:(1; 3; 0) if R = R^;G(R) otherwise:
Then, f  is ecient, individually rational, and position-wise envy-free. However, f 
is not strategy-proof. To see this, let R1 2 R be such that p(R1) = 2 and 3 P1 1.
Then, f (R1; R^ 1) = G(R1; R^ 1) = (2; 2; 0) and thus, f 1 (R1; R^ 1) = 2 P^1 1 =
f 1 (R^), a violation of strategy-proofness. 
9The notion of \strategy-proofness for same tops" states that an agent cannot gain if he truth-
fully reports his peak.
10The notion of \peak-only" states that the amount assigned to agents depends only on their
peaks.
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